A sequent calculus for hybrid logics is developed from a calculus for classical predicate logic by a series of transformations. We formalize the semantic theory of hybrid logic using a sequent calculus for predicate logic plus axioms. This works, but it is ugly. The unattractive features are removed one-by-one, until the final vestiges of the metalanguage can be set aside to reveal a fully internalized calculus. The techniques are quite general and can be applied to a wide range of hybrid and modal logics.
Introduction
The classical beauty of Gentzen's sequent calculus is obvious from first acquaintance. Each logical operator is precisely characterized by a pair of rules with perfect economy. The operators appear only in the conclusion of the rules, which are constructed from a tidy arrangement of subformulas. Every symbol occurs only in the place that best explains its function; nothing is wasted.
The fit between the geometry of sequent proofs and classical predicate logic is almost too perfect. When we try to use similar techniques with other logics, it never quite works. With intuitionistic logic the left-right symmetry is broken; with modal logics, there are ugly restrictions on the contexts. This paper is a contribution to our understanding of why this happens.
We propose a means of analysing the form of a logic by the process of internalization. A calculus is fully internalized if the only symbols that occur in the rules of the calculus are symbols of the object language. No labels or special positional operators are allowed-only the geometry of syntactic structure and rules governing how logical symbols may be added and subtracted. Gentzen's sequent calculi are all fully internalized, as are many of the calculi proposed for modern applied logics. Yet almost all of them require the symmetry-breaking contortions of intuitionistic and modal logic.
Contrast the situation in proof theory with that in model theory. There, applied logics have a natural home in the world of Kripke structures. A semantic theory of relations can be constructed for almost all known logics, and each one is more-or-less as good as the others. The theory proposes a network of extra-logical machinery-accessibility relations and the like-in terms of which the logical operators are translated. This is an external approach to logic because it uses much beyond the syntax of the object language.
The passage from external semantic theory to fully internalized calculus is well-understood, especially among those logicians who can knock up a sequent calculus for a new modal logic before breakfast. The strategy involves an implicit translation of everything back into firstorder predicate logic. The axioms of the semantic theory are typically first-order, and so their logical properties can be seen through their representation in the sequent calculus for classical first-order predicate logic. The trick is to see how to get the effect of the classical sequent rules using the syntax of the new logic.
In this paper, we formalize the process of internalization explicitly using, first, an expression of the external semantic theory in classical predicate logic, and then a series of transformations taking us to more-and-more internalized calculi, dropping the metalogical props one by one.
To illustrate the process, we focus on hybrid logics. Hybrid logics lie at the boundary between predicate logic and propositional modal logic, making them an especially appropriate focus for proof-theoretic techniques that also cross between these realms. Recent papers [3, 16, 8, 7] have developed a number of proof systems for hybrid logics, some of which are fully internalized. And, of course, they all have clearly formulated Kripke-style semantic theories. They form a perfect case study for a theory of internalization! 1 We begin Section 2 by reviewing the semantic theory of hybrid logics, which we express as a set of axioms in a formal metalanguage. In Section 3 we introduce a variant of the classical sequent calculus for predicate logic that is especially good at handling equality, and add axioms to capture the formal semantics of hybrid logics. Section 4 regains the Subformula Property, which was lost with the addition of axioms, by generating rules for the hybrid operators. The Subformula Property is essential to the process because it allows us to throw away extraneous rules while maintaining completeness. The resulting system still uses metalogical labels to control the flow of information in a proof, but these are removed with the use of the hybrid operators in Section 5.
Hybrid languages and their formal semantics
Hybrid logics have a long history and a number of interesting applications. We refer the reader to [10] for a wealth of information about these logics and an extensive bibliography. Our present interest in hybrid logics is merely that of providing an example of a broad class of logics for which the internalization strategy is particularly appropriate.
There are two routes to understanding hybrid logics. The first, and most common, is to think of them as propositional modal logics enriched with various devices from predicate logic to increase their expressive power. An alternative perspective, adopted here, sees them as the contextualization of predicate logic.
Let Ä be the language of predicate logic with individual variables Ü ( Ü ½ Ü ¾ ), property symbols Ô ( Ô ½ Ô ¾ ), and (binary) relation symbols Ö ( Ö ½ Ö ¾ ). Closed formulas of Ä express properties of relational structures via the definition of truth in a structure. For example, the formula Ü Ö Ü Ü is satisfied by those structures having a reflexive Ö-relation.
Hybrid logic results from the contextualization of these properties to elements of a structure. We aim to express the contextual properties of an element of the structure using formulas with an implicit parameter that refers to that element. Any formula of Ä with one free variable expresses such a property-we move to hybrid logic by erasing the free variable and assuming that its reference is supplied as an implicit parameter.
A property symbol Ô combines with a variable Ü to give a formula ÔÜ. Hide the Ü and you get the hybrid formula Ô, which can be combined with other formulas using the standard Boolean operators. The formula Ý´ÖÜÝ ² ÔÝµ becomes a modal formula ¦ Ö Ô when the variable Ü is hidden and assumed to refer to the point of evaluation. All this is present in ordinary modal logic. We get the specifically hybrid operators by applying the same idea to a wider class of formulas. For example, when the Ü of Ü Ý is hidden we get the nominal Ý, but now as a formula that can be combined with other formulas using logical operators. In a context in which Ý refers to an element of a structure, the new hybrid formulas Ý expresses the property of being identical to .
The language À of hybrid logic is defined as follows. The atomic formulas of À are the individual variables and the property symbols. Complex formulas are built up using the Boolean operators and together with unary modal operators ¦,¦ Ö , and Ü . Negation duals of the operators, ², £, £ Ö , and Ü are defined as abbreviations. The distinction between free and bound variables applies to À just as it does to Ä. The semantics of À is a straightforward adaption of the semantics of Ä. An interpretation for À is an interpretation for Ä, namely a relational structure of type´Ô ½ Ô ¾ Ö ½ Ö ¾ µ with a distinguished point, in the domain of 2 . Given an assignment of elements of to the variables, we define the relation¯(satisfies) as follows: The hybrid character of the language is further developed with the operators Ü and Ü . The only syntactic difference between these is that the downarrow operator Ü binds its variable, whereas the at operator, Ü , does not. They are interpreted in a relational structure as follows:
Clearly, there are many other possibilities for hybrid operators, and yet there is already a kind of expressive completeness. The above two operators are definable in À as ¦´Ü ² ³µ and Ü´Ü ² ³µ. In fact, every operator definable in the predicate language Ä is also definable in À (see [4] ). It may seem a little strange to focus on such a richly expressive language as À. Much of the research on hybrid languages (for example, [5, 6, 2, 1] ) has concentrated on fragments of À with much less expressive power and correspondingly lower computational complexity. We ensure that the rules developed for À can be applied to fragments by insisting that they have a subformula property. On the strictest interpretation, a rule is said to have the Subformula Property if every formula occurring in an application of a rule is a subformula of the conclusion. A complete calculus in which no rule involves more than one operator and every rule has the Subformula Property is guaranteed to be modular: select any set of operators and the set of rules using those operators will be complete for the fragment of the language formed from those operators. Similar results can be obtained even when the Subformula Property is weakened to allow a restricted class of formulas for each rule, so long as the fragment incudes the formulas in the restricted classes.
We are now ready to formalize the semantic theory of À. Let Å (for 'meta') be the language of predicate logic extending Ä with new atomic formulas of the form Ü ³, where ³ is a formula of À. The free variables of Ü ³ are Ü together with the free variables of ³. To make it (conceptually) clear that Å is a language of predicate logic, we should have introduced a fresh Ò · ½ -ary relation symbol for each formula ³ of À with Ò free variables. 
Sequent calculus for ¢-validity
Valid sequents in Å can be generated in a uniform way using the sequent calculus SÅ shown in Figure 1 . Here ³ and range over formulas of Å and and ¡ range over lists of formulas of Å. We write ¡ to mean that and ¡ contain the same set of formulas. For any expression , we write Ü Ý for the result of replacing all free occurrences of Ü in by Ý.
The rules are written in horizontal notation, with premisses listed to the left of 'µ' and conclusion to the right 3 . For proof-theoretic purposes it is useful to make a global decision about which variables can occur free in a sequent. Let Ù ½ Ù ¾ be a distinguished class of individual variables, called parameters. We restrict our attention to sequents whose free variables are all parameters and whose bound variables are not parameters, so that awkward clashes of variables can be avoided. We use Ù Ú Û to range over parameters and Ü Ý Þ to range over the more inclusive class of individual variables. ¡ is a theorem of a set of rules, such as SÅ , if it is generated by them. In other words, a sequent is a theorem if it is the conclusion of a rule whose premisses (if it has premisses) are also theorems. The generation tree for a theorem is called a proof 4 . The calculus SÅ has the celebrated Subformula Property: every formula occurring in a proof of ¡ is a subformula of a formula in or ¡. The rule of Weakening (Ï),
Structural Rules
is admissible, which means that its addition to the set of rules will not allow us to prove more theorems.
Of the rules of SÅ , only the Barwise equality rules, =L ½ and =L ¾ , may be unfamiliar 5 .
Together they allow the replacement of any number of occurrences of Ù by Ú and Ú by Ù in a sequent containing Ù Ú on the left side. An advantage of the Barwise rules is the straightforward way in which the following result may be stated:
PROOF. The theorem is proved by the method of cut-elimination: we show that every application of -called a cut-can be pushed up the proof tree until it falls off the leaves. Technically, this is done by assigning a number to each cut-its cut rank-and transforming the proof so as to reduce distance between the cuts of maximal rank and the leaves. Cuts at the leaves are shown to be replaceable by axioms (Á or =R, in this case). The transformations are of two kinds. In the primary case, the cut formula is assumed to be the principal formula of both rules immediate above the cut. Typically, the transformation replaces the cut with one or more cuts of lower rank. For example, if the cut formula is ³ we have
The cut rank of ³ is less than that of ³, so this is an improvement. The second kind of transformation occurs when the cut formula is not the principal formula of the final rule of one of the two branches. In this case, we must show how the cut can be moved up that branch, closer to the leaf. For example,
For the system without the equality rules, the transformations are all standard (see, for example, [15] ). The treatment of the equality rules deserves some comment. In the primary case, there is no difficulty at all in removing cuts whose cut formula is an equation:
But the secondary case is a little more involved: PROOF. To demonstrate soundness (the 'if' direction), we need only observe that if the premisses of an SÅ rule are valid, then so is the conclusion. Completeness (the 'only if' direction) follows from Theorem 3.1 and the completeness of the predicate calculus with identity, given the derivability of standard sequent axioms of predicate logic 8 . Since the only nonstandard rules are the equality rules, we need only observe that reflexivity, symmetry, and transitivity are easily derived: ¡ is a theorem of SÅ ¼ . 6 We write £ for the result of renaming the parameters in that are introduced by a restricted rule, such as L. 7 In the manuscript, [14] , cut-elimination is proved in a less direct manner, using redundant equality axioms in addition to the rules. In effect, the substitution we perform above is there postponed until the elimination algorithm reaches the leaves of the tree. 8 
¡ is a theorem of S(Å +A¢+C).
Unfortunately, the C rules cannot be entirely eliminated from proofs in S(Å +A¢+C), which lacks the Subformula Property. This limits the theoretical utility of the calculus greatly. Before addressing this problem, let us just note that with standard abbreviations, the rules listed in Figure 2 can all be derived in SÅ . 
Derived Logical Rules
²L ³ ¡ µ´³ ² µ ¡. ²R ¡ ³ ¡ µ ¡ ´³ ² µ L ¡ ³ ¡ µ´³ µ ¡ R ³ ¡ µ ¡ ´³ µ. L ³ ¡ ¡ ³ µ´³ µ ¡ R ³ ¡ ¡ ³µ ¡ ´³ µ L ³ Ü Ù ¡ µ Ü ³ ¡ R ¡ ³ Ü Ù µ ¡ Ü ³ if Ù does not occur in ³ ¡.
Regaining the Subformula Property
The barrier to the elimination of C from S(Å +A¢+C), are cuts involving the formulas of ¢. 
where ³ is a formula of ¢ and is the principal formula of the final rule of .
PROOF. This is a standard result for adding axioms to a system of rules from which C is eliminated [15] . The 'axiom cuts', as they are called, are the only cuts whose rank cannot be reduced by the standard elimination algorithm.
To go further, we need to replace the axioms from ¢ with rules that do the same work. In the above example, we need a rule for proving sequents of the form which we call R. Given this rule, our example proof can be rewritten without the cut, as follows:
Using the same method, we get a rule for on the left:
with the restriction that Ú does not occur in ³ ¡. Together, these two rules will replace the need for the axiom from ¢, with the advantage that they obey a subformula property. PROOF. We need only show that each of the rules in À and À Å is derivable in S(Å +A¢+C), and that each of the axioms of A¢ is derivable in S(Å + À+ À Å+C). We have already given an example of a derivation of the first kind; our method of discovering the rules is to construct such a derivation. Here is an example of the derivation of an axiom from a rule. Let be
The other derivations are all similarly straightforward.
LEMMA 4.3 C is admissible in S(Å + À+ À Å).
PROOF. To eliminate cuts from proofs in S(Å + À+ À Å+C) we follow the method described in the proof of Theorem 3.1. We have to show that (1) cuts can be pushed through the new rules when the cut formula is not principal, and (2) that cut rank can be decreased when the cut formula is the principal formula of applications of the new rules. Most of the new rules do not alter the non-principal formulas, and so (1) is straightforward-we omit the details. The only problematic case is that of the Hybrid rules L ½ and L ¾ , but they are treated in the same way as we treated the =L rules in the proof of Theorem 3. 
The A ¾ rules are dealt with similarly. The only rules that deserve comment are those for the modal (¦, ¦ Ö ) and hybrid ( , ) operators, so we finish the proof with these. First the modals:
(As before, £ is the result of renaming the parameters in that are introduced by a restricted rule, such as L. Note that
Now for the hybrid operators:
A sequent of Å is ¢-valid if and only if it is a theorem of S(Å · À + À Å). The calculus S(Å + À+ À Å) gives a complete characterization of the valid sequents of Å and comes very close to having the Subformula Property. The rules of SÅ have the Subformula Property, as do those of À, with a suitable definition of the subformulas of Ù ³. We say that Ú is a subformula of Ù ³ if is the result of replacing zero or more occurrences of the parameters of a (genuine) subformula of ³. The Interface Rules lack the Subformula Property, but this is not too serious; we can replace them with axioms that have it (see Figure 4) . PROOF. From Theorem 4.4. We have to show that applications of the Interface Rules can be replaced by applications of the Interface Axioms. This is simply a matter of showing that the Interface Rules commute with all the other rules until they get to the leaves of the proof tree.
All leaves end in axioms: Á,=R, R, and the Interface Axioms. In each case, the Interface Rule can be eliminated using another axiom. For example,
The system S(Å + À+A À Å) has the Subformula Property and so we have reached the goal of this section.
Internalization and Rules for All
Now that ¢-validity in Å has been captured with a respectable sequent calculus, we can use Lemma 2.1 to provide a calculus for validity in À. Let S À be the set consisting of the Structural Rules, Á and Ë, together with the Hybrid Rules À. This is a great improvement on S(Å +A¢ · µ, but still slightly unsatisfactory because the proofs of S À are not fully internalized. The formulas occurring in the proof are not formulas of À; they are all of the form Ù ³, which belongs to the formal metalanguage Å.
To push internalization as far as possible, we will reformulate the rules of S À using the hybrid operator . This gives us the system S À, shown in Figure 5 . Without we would have to look much more closely at the structure of proofs to make any further progress toward internalization.
S À is fully internalized: the only formulas occurring in proofs are formulas of À.
What's more, it has the Subformula Property, if we reinterpret the definition of subformula appropriately. The only remaining drawback is that the calculus applies only to a fragment of the language: the formulas of the form Ù ³. This is sufficient for the purpose of characterizing validity, because every sequent ¡ is equivalent to a sequent in this fragment, namely, Ù Ù ¡. Yet the absence of rules for dealing with sequents without is regrettable, and unnecessary. In the final tuning of our proof-theoretic apparatus, we aim for a more egalitarian logic in which there are 'Rules for All'. sequent is enough to anchor all non--prefixed formulas to the same element and so removes the need for them to share a prefix. To shift between -prefixed formulas and free nominals we need the Nominal Rules AE, shown in Figure 6 . Nominal Many of the rules in AE À are very familiar. The operators of classical logic involve no hybrid interaction and so have returned to a familiar form. Interestingly, the rules for the modal operators use both nominals and the operator. The price of implementing our policy of rules for all is that the calculus no longer enjoys the Subformula Property. A proof may contain any number of -prefixes not in the end sequent, introduced using the rules. Of course, we know that excessive introduction of prefixes is unnecessary, and from the proofs of Lemma 5.2 and Theorem 5.3 we see that only one layer of prefixes is ever needed.
The internalization strategy, illustrated here for hybrid logics, can be applied to a wide range of logical operators. Any first-order definable operator can be tackled in this way, although it is presently unclear to me how far one can go in any given case. For a candidate operator with a first-order definition, it is easy to find rules using the technique shown on page 679. Yet this process is not entirely automated. There is still a little 'tidying up' to be done, and further work showing that Cut can be eliminated. Some problems arise with operators having nested quantifiers because of the need to keep track of dependant variables, but the limits of the method have not yet been established.
For hybrid logics, full internalization is possible only because of the expressive power of the language, specifically the fine control exercised by and the nominals. For -less fragments and other modal logics, there may be no way of duplicating the function of the metalogical within the object language. In that case, the internalization strategy will halt, awaiting a more specific analysis of the structure of proofs, from which it may be possible to guess restrictions of the kind used in the sequent calculi for S4 and intuitionistic logic. Outside the realm of normal model logics and their hybrid extensions, the boundaries are even less clear. Some preliminary success has been achieved using internalization to construct a Tableaux system for S1 based on its neighbourhood semantics (see [9] ).
